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QUESTIONS PRESENTED FOR REVIEW
1.

In determining that an insurer has no statutory or

common law requirement to give notice of an insurance policy's
expiring by its own terms, did the panel of the Court of Appeals
which affirmed the trial court's grant of summary judgment decide
an important question of law which has not been, but should be,
settled by the Utah Supreme Court?
2.

Did the panel of the Court of Appeals, which

affirmed the trial court's grant of summary judgment, render a
decision in conflict with another panel of the Court of Appeals on
the same issue of law?
3.

Did the panel of the Court of Appeals, which

affirmed the trial court's grant of summary judgment, render a
decision in conflict with a decision of the Utah Supreme Court?
4.

Did the panel of the Court of Appeals, which

affirmed the trial court's grant of summary judgment, so far
depart from the accepted and usual course of judicial proceedings
or so far sanction such a departure by the trial court as to call
for the Supreme Court's exercise of its powers of supervision?

STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION
This Court has jurisdiction over this matter pursuant to
Sections 78-2-2(3)(a) and (5) UTAH CODE ANNOT.

This is a petition
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for certiorari filed by Petitioner pursuant to Rules 45 to 51 of
the Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure,
CONTROLLING PROVISIONS OR STATUTES, ETC,
Respondent submits the only controlling statutory
provisions important to the consideration of the Petition are the
rules of appellate procedure for petitions for writs of
certiorari Rules 45-51 of the Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure.
The statutes and the case law set forth and described in the
Petition for Writ of Certiorari merely mimic and reiterate those
set forth and fully briefed to the Court of Appeals by both
parties.

The Court of Appeals determined that the interpretation

of those statutes and other legal issues were not necessary in
rendering its opinion herein.

To the extent this Court reviews

the merits herein, the following constitutional and statutory
provisions were cited by Petitioner to the Court of Appeals, but
were deemed to be irrelevant and inapplicable:
§ 31A-21-303 UTAH CODE ANNOT. (1953 as amended)
§ 70C-6-304 UTAH CODE ANNOT. (1953 as amended)
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Nature of the Proceedings Below
Plaintiff/Appellant STUART, INC. ("STUART"), a Utah
corporation which was involuntarily dissolved by the Utah State
Department of Business Regulation on March 1, 1987 (R. 138)
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commenced this action by filing a complaint against
Defendant/Respondent JOHN DEERE INSURANCE CO. (-JOHN DEEREH) on
August 1, 1988 (R. 1-13),
The Complaint contained one cause of action.

STUART

complained of JOHN DEERE1s alleged failure to abide by the terms
of an insurance policy which STUART alleged was contained within a
Retail installment Contract ("Contract") (R. 2). The Retail
installment Contract covered STUART'S purchase of a John Deere
backhoe from Scott Machinery Company in Salt Lake City/ Utah (R.7).
JOHN DEERE filed a motion for summary judgment on
March 3, 1989 (R. 24-25).

JOHN DEERE also filed a memorandum of

points and authorities (R. 26-33) and# initially, two affidavits
in support of its motion, those of Terry Digman (R. 34-44) and
Howard Payne (R. 45-56).

On or about March 14, 1989, and at the

request of STUART, JOHN DEERE consented to extend the time within
which STUART could respond to JOHN DEERE's motion (R. 57). On
April 17, 1989 JOHN DEERE filed the Amended Affidavit of Howard
Payne, which certified that the insurance policy attached to it
was the policy in effect at the time STUART alleges it suffered
its loss (R. 63-92).
On May 16, 1989 (over 10 weeks after JOHN DEERE filed its
motion), STUART filed its Statement of Points in Opposition to
Defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment and in Support of
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Plaintiffs Cross-Motion for Summary Judgment (R. 93-109). On
June 15, 1989, JOHN DEERE filed its Reply Brief in Support of its
motion for summary judgment and in opposition to STUART'S cross
motion for summary judgment (R. 117-127).

Attached to this Reply

Brief were the Affidavit of Deborah M. Kamenetzky (R. 128-137) and
a certified copy of the March 1, 1987 Certificate of Dissolution
by which STUART was no longer recognized as a legal entity in Utah
(R. 138). STUART'S Reply Memorandum in support of its Cross
Motion was filed on June 22, 1989 (R. 143-149).
On August 10, 1989 JOHN DEERE filed a Supplemental
Memorandum of Points and Authorities in Support of its motion for
Summary Judgment (R. 165-175).

That memorandum included a copy of

a very recent memorandum opinion made, after trial to a jury, by
the U.S. District Court for the Western District of Arkansas on
June 19, 1989 ("Arkansas Decision11).

STUART replied to the

Arkansas Decision on August 17, 1989 (R. 176-180).

Finally, on

August 22, 1989 JOHN DEERE filed a motion for leave to set up
counterclaim in the event its motion for summary judgment was
denied (R. 181-183).
After all supporting and opposing memoranda had been
filed, the Second District Court heard oral argument on
September 5, 1989. At the hearing on September 5, 1989, the lower
court took the motions under advisement (R. 184).
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On September 18, 1989, the lower court ruled on the
pending motions for summary judgment.

The lower court granted

JOHN DEERE's motion for summary judgment and denied STUART'S cross
motion for summary judgment (R. 195-197).

The lower court later

ruled that JOHN DEERE's motion for leave to set up counterclaim
was moot (R. 202).
At the lower court's direction, and pursuant to Rule
4-504 UCJA, JOHN DEERE prepared and served its proposed Order of
Summary Judgment and Dismissal of Complaint with Prejudice
(MOrderM) to counsel for STUART on September 21, 1989 (R. 207).
STUART made no objections to the form of the proposed order, and
the lower court signed and entered the Order on October 4, 1989
(R. 206).
STUART filed its Notice of Appeal on October 27, 1989
(R. 208). On November 17, 1989 STUART moved this Court for
summary disposition in its favor pursuant to Rule 10(A)(3) of the
rules of this Court in effect at that time. After JOHN DEERE
filed its Memorandum in Opposition to that motion, this Court
denied STUART'S motion on December 22, 1989, pouring this case
over to the Utah Court of Appeals on January 23, 1990.
On December 19, 1990 the Utah Court of Appeals rendered
its Decision affirming the trial court's grant of summary
judgment.

(Opinion attached hereto as Appendix A ) .
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St9t$ment Qf the Facts
JOHN DEERE is an insurance company which provides
insurance for John Deere & Company ("Deere & Company"), the
manufacturers of heavy equipment (R. 128). One of the policies by
which JOHN DEERE insures Deere & Company is a Retail installment
Sales Floater Policy No. IM-14319 (hereafter "Master Policy")
(R. 128). The Master Policy insures property owned by Deere &
Company# and property sold under contract wherever that property
is located (R. 68, 77). The effective date of the Master Policy
is January 1, 1982 (R. 128). The Master Policy originally
included an "Attachment of Insurance" provision, which provided,
in part, as follows,
This insurance terminates when the actual maturity date
of the note is reached or the date on which the security
interest of John Deere in said equipment terminates,
whichever first occurs.
(R. 128, 68). This shall hereafter be referred to as the
"termination language."
In 1983, it was the agreement and intention of the
parties to the Master Policy, JOHN DEERE and Deere & Company, that
the Master Policy would be changed to cover not only the actual
financed merchandise, but to cover any additional security in
favor of Deere & Company (R. 128). This additional security
insurance amendment to the Master Policy was the only change
contemplated and agreed to by the parties (R. 129). Initially, it

-6Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

was not put into writing.

Between 1983 and 1989, JOHN DEERE

honored all claims for loss of or damage to non-financed
merchandise and equipment/ notwithstanding the fact that no
formal, written amendment was made to that portion of the Master
Policy (R. 129).
In June, 1988, Deborah Kamenetzky, an in-house attorney
for JOHN DEERE, undertook to revise the language in the Attachment
of Insurance provision to reflect the intention of the parties
regarding non-financial merchandise (R. 129). This change in the
Master Policy was not formalized by writing until January, 1989
(10 months after STUART suffered its loss and 5 years after it
purchased the insurance) (R. 2, 129). By a clerical error, the
termination language was omitted from the amended Attachment of
Insurance provision (R. 129, 131, 81).
Because John Deere*s security interest in the various
machinery and equipment it sells under contract will vary per the
terms of each and every individual contract, the Master Policy is
not sent to them.

Rather, individual certificates of insurance

are sent to each of the additional insureds, such as STUART (R. 9).
On December 20, 1983 STUART purchased a 1984 John Deere
backhoe ("Backhoe") from Scott Machinery Company in Salt Lake
City, Utah.

This purchase was primarily on credit, since STUART

paid $23,406.50 of the $82,266.50 sales price (R. 7). STUART
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executed a Retail Purchase Installment Contract ("Contract-) by
which it applied for credit from the John Deere Industrial
Equipment Company to finance the remaining $62,194.29 of the
purchase price (R. 7). The Contract provided for monthly payments
to be made to John Deere by STUART, beginning on April 1# 1984 and
ending on April 1, 1988 (R. 7). John Deere Industrial accepted
the Contract on March 7, 1984 (R. 7).
The Contract also required STUART to obtain physical
damage insurance for the Backhoe (R. 8). The reason for this
requirement was simple— until John Deere Industrial was paid
off, it wanted to make sure that there was adequate insurance on
the Backhoe to protect its security interest.

The Contract

contained the following language:
If physical damage insurance is purchased by holder, I
(we) will be furnished a certificate which describes the
insurance. Such insurance shall terminate if the
indebtedness is discharged, or if the holder's security
interest in the equipment terminates, . . . or at the end
of the term of the contract. . . . Any refunds or return
premiums shall be applied toward existing indebtedness
hereunder with the excess, if any, returned to me (us).
(R. 8).
STUART elected to purchase insurance from JOHN DEERE and
paid a premium in the amount of $2,972.29 (R. 7). After John
Deere Industrial accepted the Contract, it sent a Certificate of
Physical Insurance ("Certificate of Insurance-) to STUART.

After

STUART received the Certificate of Insurance, and presumably read
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its terms and description of insurance, STUART did not cancel the
insurance and purchase insurance with different terms.

STUART

elected to keep the Backhoe insured under the terms described in
the Certificate of Insurance.
STUART'S certificate of insurance set forth the relevant
dates of the Master Policy as it applied to STUART.

The effective

date of the insurance as to STUART was December 20, 1983, the date
of purchase (R. 9). In addition to this information, the
Certificate of Insurance repeated to STUART what the Contract had
stated:
This certifies that the equipment . . . is insured . . .
until the expiration date shown above unless the
insurance is terminated sooner as provided in the next
sentence. The insurance shall terminate immediately
without notice if any one of the following events occurs:
the indebtedness is discharged; John Deere's security
interest in the property which is the subject of the
contract terminates; . . . or the Retail installment
Sales Floater Policy under which John Deere has purchased
the insurance is terminated.
(R. 9).
STUART never relied upon the Master Policy, nor did
STUART even see a copy of the Master Policy until after this
litigation commenced (R. 196, 206) (See, also. STUART'S Memorandum
of Points and Authorities in Support of its Motion for Summary
Disposition, p. 6). In its Complaint, STUART alleged that the
Contract was the insurance policy.

"Defendant issued to Plaintiff

a Physical Damage Insurance Policy, No. 870276283AA. . . ."
(R. 2). The Contract is not the insurance agreement.
-9-
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On or about January 20, 1988# STUART contacted John Deere
Credit Services and requested a payoff amount (R.34).

STUART was

advised that the Backhoe could be paid off in full by February 10/
1988 for the sum of $5,578.72 (R. 34). On February 5, 1988,
STUART paid $5#578.72 to John Deere Credit, which included a
credit for the unearned insurance premium (R. 35).
On March 9, 1988 the Backhoe was destroyed by fire of
unknown origin (R. 2). STUART made a claim against what it
thought was the insurance policy, which claim was denied by JOHN
DEERE for the reason that upon STUART's early payoff, the
indebtedness was discharged and Deere & Company no longer had a
security interest in the Backhoe (R. 2). These events effected an
expiration of the policy, and STUART brought its lawsuit.
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
This Court should deny the Petition for Writ of
Certiorari because there is no reasonable legal or factual basis
for the rule of law which was rejected by two courts below, and
which Petitioner asks this Court to adopt.

Petitioner's essential

claim is that an insurer should be required to give an insured
notice when a policy has expired by its terms.

This is a position

impliedly rejected by the Utah state legislature when it recently
recodified its entire insurance code and failed to insert such a
requirement.

Also, this position was expressly rejected by the
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Utah Court of Appeals in various published decisions, one of which
is cited by Petitioner in its Petition.
The purposes behind the rules governing writs of
certiorari from a decision of the Court of Appeals are to serve
the interest in continuity and consistency of law, unless there is
some suggestion that either the trial court or Court of Appeals
has strayed from the usual course of judicial proceedings in such
a way that this Court should review the matter.

The Court of

Appeals already determined, when it decided to issue its opinion
without publication, that the factual and legal issues involved
were uncomplicated and not particularly noteworthy.

This Court

impliedly did so as well, when it determined to pour this case
over to the Court of Appeals.

Therefore, this Court should deny

the Petition.
As a separate matter, in light of the complete absence of
a reasonable factual and legal basis for the Petition, and because
the Court of Appeals was silent on the issue of costs to be
awarded upon remittitur, Respondent respectfully asks this Court
to award it its costs on appeal, its costs on the Petition, and a
reasonable attorneys' fee in opposing the Petition as a sanction
under Rules 33 and 34 of the Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure.
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/

ARGUMENT
I.

PETITIONER RAISED NO ISSUES IMPORTANT TO CERTIFICATION
Respondent recognizes that the four grounds for granting

a writ of certiorari set forth in Rule 46 are not complete/ in
that they do not set forth all of the grounds or reasons upon
which this Court may desire to review a decision of the Court of
Appeals.

However, Rule 46 does indicate that a petition for writ

of certiorari should be granted only for reasons of a "character"
similar to those expressly set forth in Rule 46.

Respondent

herein respectfully submits that the "character" of reasons for
certiorari fall into two underlying policies.
The first and predominant policy underlying Rules 45-51
(embodied in subparts (a), (b), and (d) of Rule 46) is to make the
law in Utah clear and unambiguous.

This policy suggests that this

Court should address any inconsistencies between any respective
decisions within separate panels of the Court of Appeals, or
between the Court of Appeals and this Court.

Further, if the

Court of Appeals has addressed an important issue of law, this
Court may want to settle the matter.

The second policy (embodied

in subpart (c) of Rule 46) is to ensure that neither the trial
court nor the Court of Appeals has departed from procedure such
that a party's rights have been materially prejudiced.
A reading of the Petition reveals that Petitioner is
essentially making the same arguments it has made to both the
-12Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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trial court and to the Court of Appeals, which arguments amount to
a disagreement over the interpretation of an insurance contract.
Two courts, one trial court and one appellate court, have already
heard Petitioner's claims and rejected them.

In the case of the

Court of Appeals, the factual and legal issues were deemed to be
of so uncomplicated and unimportant a nature that it elected not
to publish a written opinion.

Presumably, this Court similarly

determined that the issues presented were not novel, unique or
sufficiently important when it poured the case over to the Court
of Appeals in January, 1990.

Because Petitioner has made no

showing of a reason to review the Court of Appeals' decision, this
Court should deny the Petition for Writ of Certiorari.
A.

Three Of The Four Grounds For Granting Certiorari
Are Not Even Pled by Petitioner.

Petitioner made no showing, and did not even contend that
the Court of Appeals' affirmation of the trial court's grant of
summary judgment conflicted with any other decisions of another
panel of the Court of Appeals, or of this Court.

Further,

Petitioner did not and can not claim that the trial court or Court
of Appeals so far departed from any procedures that a review by
this Court is merited.

Therefore, the only grounds upon which

Petitioner does claim entitlement to a review by this Court is a
so called "important social policty]" (Petition For Writ Of
Certiorari at p. 18) supposedly safeguarded by the Utah state
-13Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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legislature.

Respondent submits that the clear and unambiguous

language of both the insurance contract at issue, as well as the
statutes cited by Petitionee do not require an insurance company
to notify an insured when an insurance policy expires of its own
terms/ which is precisely what happened in this case.
B.

The Court Of Appeals' Ruling Was Consistent With
Clear And Unambiguous Law, And Review By This Court
Is Unnecessary.

Petitioner misunderstands the purpose of its Petition for
Certiorari, and the requirements of Rules 45-51 of the Rules of
Appellate Procedure.

In its Petition, Petitioner has mimicked the

same arguments it made to the trial court and to the Court of
Appeals.

In its Conclusion, Petitioner asks this Court to reverse

the decision of the Court of Appeals and to grant its motion for
cross summary judgment.

Seeking affirmative relief is not the

purpose of a petition.

The purpose of the Petition is to try to

demonstrate to this Court important reasons for review, and not to
reargue the case.

Should this Court determine that sufficient

reasons for review exist, then, pursuant to Rule 51(b) of the
Rules of Appellate Procedure, briefing and oral argument on the
merits would be appropriate.

As impliedly conceded by Petitioner,

no justification for review by this Court exists outside of the
same legal arguments made to two courts below.
In considering the Petition, this Court should note first
that there was no factual dispute below.

Petitioner conceded this
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when it made its cross motion for summary judgment. (R. 93-109).
Therefore, there are only legal issues involved.
The second point which this Court should consider, or
rather reject, is that there was some kind of "secret*1 or "silent"
termination of the insurance policy herein by John Deere.

Neither

the trial court, nor the Court of Appeals found that the insurance
policy was terminated.

Rather, each found that the insurance

contract expired by its own terms. When every document in the
hands of the Petitioner unambiguously informed it that paying off
the backhoe would end the insurance contract, Petitioner's claims
of not knowing about the insurance's expiring are unfounded.
Lastly, Petitioner asks this Court to find an obligation
to insure when no premium for the time period during which the
loss occurred was paid.

Petitioner claims on page 11 of its

Petition that "Plaintiff did not receive a full refund of
insurance premiums until after the date of loss."
and there is no factual dispute on the matter.

This is false,

The record is

clear that on February 5, 1988, Petitioner paid off its backhoe,
which payment included an offsetting credit for unearned premium.
(R. at 35). This occurred 5 weeks before the backhoe was
destroyed by fire on March 9, 1988 (R. at 2), during which time
Petitioner could have obtained insurance from another source.
Therefore, Petitioner's claims of having been dealt with unfairly,
secretly, or silently are unsupported and insupportable.
-15Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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1.

Ut9h C9SS t*9w SUPPOrti? the CPVFt Pf Appeals' Decision.

Petitioner impliedly concedes the legal and statutory
propriety of an insurance policy's expiring by its own terms,
without the legal necessity of notice by the insured.

Petitioner

concedes the exception to notice requirements where "the
termination is for nonpayment of premiums at the normally
scheduled expiration date occurring at the "end of the one-year
policy term."

Petition at pp. 10-11. Petitioner also stated that

the policy reason for allowing the policy to expire without
further notice is because "the insured obviously knows of his own
present delinquency in making premium payments."

I£. at 11. This

same policy, applied to John Deere's contract, compels the same
conclusion reached by the trial court and by the Court of Appeals.
Petitioner certainly knew that it had paid off the backhoe, and certainly knew that John Deere1s security interest in the
backhoe dissolved upon final payment.

Those two conditions to

policy expiration were made known to Petitioner from the beginning
of the contract, and it cannot now claim ignorance.

It would be

equally unavailing to the Petitioner to say he was unaware of the
requirement to pay a policy premium, and therefore failure to pay
it should not work an expiration of the policy until he was
formally notified.

Such a legal position was acknowledged by

Petitioner to be meritless, yet it is no different from the
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position it asserts now.

The Court of Appeals has made this clear

in at least two rulings, Godoy v. Farmers Ins. Group, 759 P.2d
1173/ 1175-76 (Utah Ct. App. 1988) and Clarke v. American Concept
Ins. Co., 758 P.2d 470, 473 (Utah Ct. App. 1988).

For these

reasons, a writ of certiorari is unwarranted in this case.
C.

The Statutes Cited By Petitioner Do Not Require
Notice When An Insurance Policy Expires By Its Own
Terms.

Petitioner cites to Sections 31A-21-201,
31A-21-303(1)(C), 31A-21-303(2)(a)(iv), 31A-21-303(3), 31A-21-304
and 70C-6-304 UTAH CODE ANNOT. as controlling statutes to be
considered by this Court.

Petition at ii-iii. Of these,

Petitioner only referenced sections 31A-21-303(1)(c),
31A-21-303(3) and 70C-6-304 as controlling in the appeal below,
which it did pursuant to Rule 24(a)(3) of the Utah Rules of
Appellate Procedure.
Appellant at iv.

Brief of Appellant at iv; Reply Brief of

Any issues and/or arguments raising statutes not

considered by the Court of Appeals below are contrary to the
policy of this Court, expressed numerous times, that failure to
raise an issue with a lower court precludes a later review.

See,

e.g. Beroer v. Minnesota Mutual Life Ins. Co. of St. Paul. 723
P.2d 388, 392 (Utah 1986).

Therefore, this Court may disregard

the applicability, or not, of Sections 31A-21-201,
31A-21-303(2)(a)(iv) and 31A-21-304 UTAH CODE ANNOT. to the issues
raised herein.
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Even if this Court considers all of the statutes cited by
Petitioner, one thing is clear.

Each of the statutes contemplate

situations in which the insurer, either on its own or at the
request of a third party such as a creditor, affirmatively
terminates the insurance policy in question.

These statutes

contemplate some kind of unilateral act of the insurer, in which
case notice of that act of cancellation or termination is
required.

This Court should disregard those statutes for the same

reason that the Court of Appeals found them irrelevant and
unavailing.
The facts of this case do not lead us to the conclusion
that John Deere cancelled the policy. "Cancellation" in
the insurance context is the right to rescind, abandon,
or cancel a contract of insurance. [Citation omitted].
John Deere took no action to cancel the policy. Such
action was not necessary. The policy expired based upon
its own terms.

1

<

December 19, 1990 Opinion at p. 3.
Because none of the statutes or policies raised by
Petitioner are applicable to an insurance contract which expired
<

of its own clear and unambiguous terms, this Court should deny the
Petition for Writ of Certiorari.
II.

THIS COURT SHOULD AWARD ATTORNEYS' FEES AND COSTS TO
RESPONDENT.
Rule 34(a) of the Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure

(

requires costs to be awarded to the appellee in cases where an
appeal is dismissed and the parties have not otherwise agreed, or
-18Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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<

the court has not otherwise ordered that costs would not be
awarded.

The Opinion of the Court of Appeals is silent on the

issue of costs. Under Rule 34(d)# and since the case was remitted
back to the district court on January 9, 1991, Respondent had
until January 24, 1991 to file its verified bill of costs with the
district court.

However, Petitioner filed its Petition on or

about January 17, 1991, thereby removing jurisdiction from the
district court, and tolling the time period for a billing of costs
to be filed.

If this Court determines to deny the Petition for

Writ of Certiorari, Respondents respectfully request that this
Court order the taxing of costs on appeal against Petitioner,
including costs incurred in connection with the Petition for Writ
of Certiorari.
Further, pursuant to Rule 33 of the Utah Rules of
Appellate Procedure, Respondent respectfully submits that
Petitioner's Petition was frivolous, and requests an award of its
attorneys' fees incurred in connection herewith.

Petitioner's

arguments to impose a common law duty upon insurers requiring
notification of an insurance policy's expiration on its own terms
are not good faith arguments to extend, modify, or reverse
existing law.

Petitioner's arguments lack any reasonable basis in

fact or law, and are therefore frivolous.
Egregious cases may include those obviously without
merit, with no reasonable likelihood of success, and
which result in the delay of a proper judgment.
-19Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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Mauahan v. Mauahan, 770 P.2d 156, 161 (Utah Ct. App. 1989).

See

also Erickson v. Wasatch Manor, 149 Utah Adv. Rep. 71, 73 (Utah
Ct. Ap. 1990); O'Brien v. Rush 744 P.2d 306, 309 (Utah Ct. App.
1987).
Petitioner has essentially asked this Court to legislate
by requiring notice of insurance expiration when the legislature
and the Court of Appeals have impliedly and expressly rejected
such a burden.

See, Clarke, supra, 758 P.2d at 473.

Seeking

judicial legislation is not a good faith attempt to modify or
extend existing law.

For these reasons, and because Respondent

has had to incur the attorneys fees and costs associated with
responding to all of Petitioner's meritless claims throughout this
litigation, Respondent respectfully asks this Court to award it
its attorneys' fees incurred in connection with the Petition.
CONCLUSION
For the reasons set forth above, Respondent respectfully
requests that this Court deny the Petition for Writ of Certiorari,
to grant it all of its costs on appeal, and to award attorneys'
fees incurred in connection with the Petition.
Respectfully submitted/

dW
Mark 0. Morris
Attorney for Respondent
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Attorneys:

Douglas M. Durbano, Paul H. Johnson and David
Miller, Ogden, for Appellant
Mark 0. Morris, Salt Lake City, for Appellee

Before Judges Billings, Jackson, and Orme.
JACKSON, Judge:
Stuart, Inc. (Stuart) appeals from a summary judgment
dismissing its claim of breach of contract. Stuart asserts
three claims of error: (1) there was a genuine issue of
material fact concerning whether the insurance contract was an
integrated document; (2) the trial court improperly derived the
intent of the parties from extrinsic and parol evidence; and
(3) the trial court erred in finding that the insurance
contract terminated prior to April 1, 1988, without notice of
cancellation. Stuart claims that any one of the above errors
would preclude the trial court from granting summary judgment
to John Deere Insurance Company (John Deere). Thus, Stuart
asserts that we should reverse the trial court's grant of
summary judgment on John Deere*s motion and grant the
plaintiff's cross-motion for summary judgment. We affirm.
FACTS
On December 20, 1983, Stuart purchased a backhoe from John
Deere Industrial Equipment Company on a retail installment
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contract. John Deere issued an insurance policy covering the
backhoe. On February 5, 1988, Stuart made the final payment on
the installment contract- On March 9, 1988, the backhoe was
destroyed by fire. Stuart made a claim under the insurance
contract, which was denied by John Deere.1
On August 1, 1988, Stuart filed a complaint alleging
breach of contract by John Deere. After oral arguments, based
on the stipulated material facts, the trial court granted
summary judgment in favor of John Deere. Stuart appealed.
ISSUE OF FACT OR LAW
Stuart first argues that there was an issue of material
fact pending before the trial court. Stuart asserts that
whether the contract was ambiguous or integrated concerning the
parties* intent is a factual question. Here, Stuart is
confusing two separate doctrines of contract law. These
doctrines concern (1) whether a written contract is fully
integrated so as to trigger the parol evidence rule; and (2)
whether a provision of a written contract is ambiguous so that
extrinsic evidence must be considered to construe it.
First, whether a contract is an integration is a question
of fact. Rinowood v. Foreign Auto Works, Inc.. 671 P.2d 182,
183 (Utah 1983). If the contract is not integrated, parol
evidence is admissible to determine the parties' intent even if
it means varying a term of the written part of the parties'
overall agreement. Here, Stuart did not raise any facts
suggesting the parties had any agreement or understandings
other than as set out in the written contract documents.
The second legal doctrine concerns whether any material
term of the contract is ambiguous. -Interpretation of a
written contract is ordinarily a question of law, and this
court need not defer to the trial court's construction." Jones
v. HinKle, 611 P.2d 733, 735 (Utah 1980); Provo cifcv Corp. v.
Neilson Scott Co., 603 P.2d 803 (Utah 1979). "Contract
provisions are not rendered ambiguous merely by the fact that
the parties urge diverse interpretations." Jones. 611 P.2d at
735. While extrinsic evidence is admissible to assist in the
interpretation of ambiguous terms, the threshold question of
whether a provision is ambiguous is a question of law. See,
e . c . Faulkner v. Farnsworth. 665 P.2d 1292, 1293 (Utah 1983).
1. Both of the parties stipulate that these are the undisputed
material facts of the case.
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We find the provisions of the basic policy and amendment to be
entirely unambiguous, as did the trial court. Thus, we
construe the critical contractual provisions, as a matter of law.
The primary policy of the insured contained the following
termination provision: "This insurance terminates when the
actual maturity date of the note is reached or the date on
which the security interest of John Deere in said equipment
terminates, whichever first occurs." An amendment to the
policy was made on September 1, 1983, without mention of the
above termination provision. The amendment to the original
policy contained the following saving language: "Nothing
herein contained shall be held to vary, waive, alter, or extend
any of the terms, conditions, agreements or declarations of the
policy, other than as herein stated." The trial court
concluded as a matter of law that, after the above amendment,
-the basic policy . . . remained the same, including that
aforementioned statement concerning termination of the policy
when the security interest of John Deere was satisfied." We
agree with the trial court's legal determination. When Stuart
paid the debt, John Deere no longer had an insurable security
interest in the backhoe. Thus, the insurance policy coverage
ended when Stuart paid off the balance owing on the retail
installment contract. We conclude as matter of law that the
insurance contract was unambiguous and the insurance coverage
terminated when Stuart paid the balance owing on the note.
Although the trial court had before it certain extrinsic
evidence, it was not relevant to the ultimate legal conclusion
because the contract was unambiguous. Thus, we need not
consider Stuarfs second issue further.
EXPIRATION OR CANCELLATION
Stuart also claims that John Deere cancelled the policy
without prior notice to the insured as required by the policy.
The facts of this case do not lead us to the conclusion that
John Deere cancelled the policy. "Cancellation- in the
insurance context is the right to rescind, abandon, or cancel a
contract of insurance. 43 Am. Jur. 2d Insurance § 380 (1982).
John Deere took no action to cancel the policy. Such action
was not necessary. The policy expired based upon its own
terms. "The usual effect of a termination of a policy is the
termination of coverage thereunder, and where a policy expires
by its own terms • • . at a specified time, generally no basis
exists thereafter upon which to predicate a recovery." 43 Am.
Jur. 2d Insurance § 237 (1982) (footnotes omitted). Here, the
policy was not cancelled as Stuart claims, but instead expired

900052-CA
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pursuant to the mutual agreement of the parties. The policy
contained a provision that it would terminate when John Deere
Industrial Equipment Company's security interest in the backhoe
terminated. When Stuart paid off the backhoe, John Deere
Industrial Equipment Company had no further insurable interest
in the backhoe. Thus, the policy expired simultaneously with
the expiration of John Deere Industrial Equipment Company's
interest in the backhoe and notice was not required. We affirm.

Norman H. Jackson,*\Judge

WE CONCUR:

a

^?l£>
^L

*judith M. Billings, Judge

Gregory if. Orme, Judge
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This cause having been heretofore argued and submittedr and
the Court being sufficiently advised in the premises, it is
now ordered, adjudged and decreed that the judgment of the
district court herein bef and the same is, affirmed.
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